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Abstract This paper examines asset prices when risk-sharing externalities are incorporated into
an inﬁnite-horizon model where consumers are exposed to the endogenous income risks. It is
shown that there exist multiple types of equilibria depending on the degree of market partici-
pation. Under incomplete participation, income risks cannot be fully diversiﬁed as they induce
higher precautionary savings, which are conducive in turn to higher asset prices. However, the
exposure to additional dividend risks can lead at the same time to a lower demand for risky as-
sets. The aggregate effect is an increase in the equity risk premium and a decrease in the risk-free
rate. Thus, the evidence suggests that the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles can be partly
explained by inﬁnite-horizon models with incomplete market participation.
Keywords Risk-sharing externalities, endogenous income risks, incomplete market participa-
tion, asset prices
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1. Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to provide some theoretical explanation for non-
market participation from some economic agents. This issue is important because by
determiningtherationalebehindthelackoffullparticipation, itmaybepossibletopro-
vide some insights on the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles. The equity pre-
mium puzzle reﬂects the difﬁculties in explaining the difference between the observed
returns on equity and risk-free rates beyond the important factors of risk aversion and
aggregate consumption risk. Even upon allowing for extremely high risk-aversion, the
implied risk-free rate exceeds the historical rates, which leads in turn to the risk-free
rate puzzle. Mehra and Prescott (1985) examine the equity premium puzzle using the
Lucas (1978) exchange economy, where the equity premium is estimated as the risk
aversion parameter multiplied by the covariance between the aggregate consumption
and return on equity. On the other hand, the risk-free puzzle is addressed by Weil
(1989), where the risk-free rate is approximated by the sum of time preference rate
and the risk aversion parameter multiplied by the expected consumption growth. The
raison d’ˆ etre of these puzzles lies in the evidence that the aggregate consumption risk
implied by national consumption statistics is rather small, which renders the explana-
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tion of high equity premia based on the risk aversion parameter, arguably difﬁcult. It
is equally difﬁcult to explain the observed risk-free rates based on this high degree
of risk aversion. Hence, these puzzles appear to be intertwined and should be ideally
addressed simultaneously.
There are several studies that attempt to provide an economic rationale for these
ﬁndings.1 Part of this literature is based on the complete Arrow-Debreu economy,
where full market participation is implicitly assumed and consumers are able to di-
versify their idiosyncratic income shocks using Arrow-Debreu securities. The equity
premium puzzle derives from the observation that if there were only insurable idiosyn-
cratic risks, investors would be exposed to small aggregate risks. It is also difﬁcult for
models based on the representative agent and complete contingent markets to explain
the behavior of asset returns. In addition, there are attempts to examine the utility
function, such as the habit formation where consumers have the incentive to smooth
out their consumption. Alternatively, it is possible to examine market incompleteness
where risk-sharing conditions may be affected by market frictions. This implies that
the aggregate consumption can be smoothed out but individual consumptions are not.
The degree of market participation is important in the explanation of consump-
tion and asset returns. The traditional assumption that all consumers participate in
fully-integrated markets is rather implausible. There is indeed strong evidence to the
contrary. Incomplete market participation is evident in many countries and the pro-
portion of non-market participants is rather signiﬁcant. Only a fraction of consumers
may invest in equity, while others may prefer to hold bank deposits only. Mankiw
and Zeldes (1991) provided early evidence that stockholders represent only a small
fraction of sample of consumers.2 The theoretical explanation for incomplete mar-
ket participation is discussed in the literature based on ﬁxed-entry costs (Abel 2001;
Vissing-Jorgensen 2002b; Weil 1992b), transaction costs and liquidity limits (Allen
and Gale 1994; Williamson 1994), borrowing constraints (Constantinides et al. 2002)
and model uncertainty (Cao et al. 2005). If consumers are assumed more plausibly,
to incur alternative types of income risk under incomplete market participation, then
they are not necessarily able to adequately diversify their income shocks. This implies
that Lucas economy models should consider endogenous income risks and incomplete
market participation.3
Thus, the raison d’ˆ etre of this paper lies in providing a rationale for non-market
participation, and the focus is made on risk-sharing externalities. The modelling app-
roach is based on an inﬁnite-horizon exchange economy. It is related to early studies
by Allen and Gale (1994), who endogenize the decision on market participation, and
examine the volatility of asset prices. Their evidence suggests that asset price volatility
1 Kocherlakota (1996) offers a survey of the literature on the equity premium puzzle.
2 The evidence provided by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) is based on the estimation of Euler equations for
stockholders and non-stockholders using data from Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The proportion of
stockholders to sample consumers amounts to 27%.
3 Incomplete market participation may be understood with respect to disparities in wealth. The relationship
between wealth, market participation and income risk diversiﬁcation is important, but it falls beyond the
scope of the present study. Sufﬁce it to state here, that it is possible for consumers to increase the relative
level of wealth through market participation, which is conducive to higher returns on equity.
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is reduced under the full participation equilibrium. Similar assumptions are made here
as income risks are assumed to be diversiﬁable under complete market participation.
In light of the critical issue raised by Allen and Gale (2001) as to how various risk-
sharing mechanisms interact, this paper examines the conditions under which there
exist two distinct mechanisms providing risk-sharing opportunities. One mechanism
takes place through implicit asset transactions between market participants whereas
the other involves banking transactions for non-market participants. It is assumed that
income risks are diversiﬁable under a given mechanism when consumers do not con-
sider the alternative mechanism. However, if consumers fall into two distinct groups,
then income risks cannot be fully diversiﬁed. Also, the present analysis is related to
Weil (1992b), who examines the effect of exogenous hand-to-mouth consumption on
asset prices. It differs however from this earlier study as the focus is rather made here
on the endogenization of the decision on market participation into the optimization
problem. The introduction of risk-sharing externalities and beliefs about the degree of
incomplete market participation allows for the examination of the effects of consumer
behavior on asset prices under multiple types of equilibria. Thus, the assumptions
underlying the present model are different from those adopted in previous studies.
The present model contributes to the literature with new evidence that there is po-
tentially multiple equilibria with incomplete market participation, full market parti-
cipation and strictly no market participation. Indeed, when risk-sharing externalities
are considered in an inﬁnite-horizon model, it can be shown that the existence of such
equilibria depends on the degree of market participation. There is evidence that income
risks cannot be fully diversiﬁed under incomplete market participation. The exposure
tosuchrisksimplieshigherprecautionarysavingsandanincreaseinassetprices. How-
ever, the exposure to additional dividend risks can be conducive at the same time to a
lower demand for risky assets. In aggregate, there is a decrease in the risk-free rate and
a simultaneous increase in equity risk premium. Thus, the results suggest that the ex-
istence of risk-sharing externalities can in part, explain simultaneously the incomplete
market participation, equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles. The paper also sheds
light on the new concept of market participation risk premium, which exists only under
equilibrium conditions of incomplete market participation.
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 introduces the economic environment
and examines the consumer decision problems. Section 3 describes the conditions of
multiple equilibria under incomplete market participation. Section 4 analyzes asset
prices using numerical calculus. It discusses the equity premium puzzle and risk-free
rate puzzle, and it examines the role of social security, which allows consumers to
insure income shocks. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The environment
Consider an exchange economy populated with inﬁnitely lived continuum consumers,
who consume a single good. Time is indexed with t =  1;0;1;::: This economy
starts at period  1, and all consumers can be classiﬁed into either type-A or type-B
agents depending on their unrestricted or restricted access to stock markets. Type-A
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agents (stockholders) hold equity while type-B agents (non-stockholders) do not. The
existence of non-stockholders has been thoroughly described in the literature, with
some studies providing a theoretical rationale for such consumers (e.g., Abel 2001;
Allen and Gale 1994; Cao et al. 2005; Constantinides et al. 2002; Vissing-Jorgensen
2002b; Williamson 1994).
Suppose that an aggregate fraction 1  m (2 [0;1]) of the population falls under
type-A agents. Therefore, market participants hold stocks xt+1 and inside bonds bt+1
given the asset prices pt and qt in period t, respectively. By deﬁnition, an inside bond
implies that the net supply is equal to zero. The equity yields stochastic dividends e dt+1
and capital gains e pt+1 in periodt+1. Non-market participants hold depositsb bt+1 given
the net deposit interest rate rt+1.
There exists a representative ﬁrm which raises money on m from bank borrowing
and 1 m through equity ﬁnancing, and allocates the funds to an investment project,
which yields e X units where fe Xtg¥
t=0 is a sequence of independent and identically dis-
tributed cash ﬂows. This assumption is rather plausible as the extent of direct ﬁnancing
is function of the demand for equity from market participants. The capital structure is
endogenized by the degree of market participation. Assume that the loan rate is equiva-
lent to the deposit interest rate r. Since the dividend is obtainable from residual proﬁts,




An increase in type-B agents induces a rise in the leverage ratio.4
Consumers receive the stochastic labor income fe yitg
¥
t=0 for i = A;B of consump-
tion good over their inﬁnite lifetime. Future labor income risk is assumed to be depen-
dent on the degree of incomplete market participation, fe yit(m)g for i = A;B. Assume
that e yit is independently and identically distributed over time, and there is no aggre-
gate uncertainty. Furthermore, let ˜ yit be subject to Et 1[e yit(m)] =E[e yit(m)]  ¯ y and
Vart 1[e yit(m)] =Var[e yit(m)] = si(m), where E denotes the expectations operator, and
Var represents the variance. It is assumed that the income risk sA(m) is increasing in
m 2 [0;1], which ensures the existence of equilibrium. On the other hand, sB(m) must
berather decreasingin m. Agents areofonly twotypes, whichmeans thateithertype-A
or type-B agents must absorb the unilateral labor-income shocks in the model without
aggregate risk. Hence, increases in the number of non-market participants under these
conditions, have the effect of diminishing their consumption risks. Income risks are
assumed to be diversiﬁable when all consumers belong to the same risk-sharing group.
However, if consumers fall into two distinct groups, then they cannot fully diversify
income risks. In an economy with full participation, income risks are assumed to be
diversiﬁable, that is, sA(0) = 0 and sB(1) = 0.5
4 In the Lucas economy, all agents invest in equity and inside bond, which implies that the net supply of
bonds is equal to zero. Such a model setting does not allow for the examination of leverage effects.
5 The background theory on these assumptions is in Appendix 1 which explains the risk-sharing externali-
ties. These assumptions are based on two empirical observations. First, the volatility of aggregate consump-
tion is very small and this may be due to the lack of variability in both stockholders’ and non-stockholders’
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The assumption of common beliefs can be made with regard to stock market par-
ticipation because the ratio of market participation affects in turn, the magnitude of
income shocks. Indeed, within this participation game, income shocks are generated
by the degree of incomplete market participation. The linkage between incomplete
participation and income risks can be understood in light of the higher volatility in
the consumption patterns of market participants, which are due to limited risk-sharing
opportunities.
Each agent consumes the amount cit of goods in period t. The preferences of










for i = A;B; b 2 (0;1) and g > 0; (1)
where b and g represent the discount factor and the risk aversion parameter, respec-
tively.
These settings are useful in redeﬁning the consumer’s problem under incomplete
market participation using the standard income-ﬂuctuations approach. The following
subsection examines type-A agent’s problem of utility maximization.
2.1 Market participants
Type-A consumers decide to participate in the equity market given the endowment with
asset x0: They hold equity xt+1 and bond bt+1 in period t, as they are associated with











subject to the sequence of budget constraints given by
cAt + ptxt+1+qtbt+1 = wAt; (2)
wAt+1 = e yA
t+1+(e dt+1+ e pt+1)xt+1+bt+1; (3)
where wAt denotes the wealth in period t.
consumptions. Alternatively, while each agent’s consumption may exhibit a degree of volatility, consump-
tion risks are offset on aggregate. Second, the empirical evidence from Attanasio et al. (2002), Brav et al.
(2002) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002a) supports the second possibility. The covariance between market par-
ticipants’ consumption and stock returns is found to be substantially large while that between non-market
participants and stock returns is small. This means that full-integrated consumption exhibits less ﬂuctuation,
and that variations in market participants’ consumptions can be offset by changes in non-market participants.
However, it should be noted also that Brav et al. (2002) suggest that part of the volatility of consumption
reported in the Consumers Expenditure Survey might be due to measurement errors.
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2.2 Non-market participants
If the value function of type-B is larger than that of type-A UB0 UA0 given the pre-
vailing beliefs about the degree of incomplete market participation, the decisions made












s.t. cBt +b bt+1 = yBt +(1+rt)b bt (4)
Under these conditions, type-B agents have no incentive to participate into the eq-
uity market. In equilibrium, non-stockholders provide one unit of deposit and consume
yBt +rt .
2.3 Equilibrium asset prices
The Euler equations are given by:
ptc
 g





At = bEt[e c
 g
At+1] (6)
Therefore, asset prices can be expressed as follows:
pt = bEt
"











It is assumed that per capita equity and deposit are supplied to the extent of one
unit. Given the assumption of inside bond, the consumption of type-A agents and
type-B agents in period t can be expressed as
c
At = yAt +dt; (7)
c
Bt = yBt +rt: (8)
The gross risk-free rate RF










e yAt+1(m)+ e dt+1
 g (9)




Bt). To derive the theoretical equity
premium, the following reference is made only to the bond interest rate for market participants.
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(e pt+1+ e dt+1)

e yAt+1(m)+ e dt+1
 g (10)



















(e pt+1+ e dt+1)

e yAt+1(m)+ e dt+1
 g (11)
Consequently, equilibrium asset prices are represented by the behavior of type-A
consumers. Given an increase in consumption risk, there is a tendency for market
participants to raise their precautionary savings, which in turn augments the demand
for both risky and risk-free assets. However, because of risk aversion due to higher
consumption risk under CRRA preference, the price of risky assets decreases, thereby
driving excess returns on equity higher. Thus, it is important to examine whether there
exist rational non-market participants or not. The following section addresses the wel-
fare properties and multiple types of equilibria.
3. Multiple equilibria
Using equations (1) and (7), the lifetime indirect utility functionV
A0 of market partici-
pants is characterized by:
V
A0 =
E[e yA(m)+ e d]1 g
(1 g)(1 b)
(12)
In the same way, from equations (1) and (8), the lifetime indirect utility function V
B0






It is clear that when E[e yB(m)+r]1 g=(1 g) E[e yA(m)+ ˜ d]1 g=(1 g), it is optimal
for consumers to be non-stockholders. The individual decision is based on the relation-
ship between V
B0 and V
A0, and on whether consumers participate in the stock market.
Therefore, non-stockholders believe that market participants would be able to absorb
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income risks. It is not optimal for these consumers to participate in the stock market if
the expected return on equity cannot compensate for risks involved with market parti-
cipation. For simplicity, it is assumed that the stochastic income (˜ yt) and dividend ( ˜ dt)
are binomially distributed.
Table 1. Distribution of ˜ yt and ˜ dt
Dividend Type-A Type-B
¯ d+e ¯ y+lm ¯ y l(1 m) with probability 0.5
¯ d e ¯ y lm ¯ y+l(1 m) with probability 0.5
Table 1 describes the binomial distribution of ˜ yt and ˜ dt, where d and l represent
the expected dividend and the magnitude of income shocks which take positive val-
ues.7 Suppose that ¯ y (1 l)m takes positive values in order to avoid cases of zero-
consumption for non-market participants. This simpliﬁcation is consistent with the
previous assumptions about the endogeneity of income risk. Indeed, if the proportion
of non-stockholders decreases, then the income shocks of market participants decrease.
In particular, under a full participation economy, income shocks can be, by assumption,
absorbed through implicit asset trading. In addition, the assumption that income ¯ y is
constant over time implies that the aggregate labor income does not ﬂuctuate. This is
supported by evidence that the aggregate risk reﬂected by national consumption statis-
tics is small (Mehra and Prescott 1985). Attanasio et al. (2002), Brav et al. (2002) and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002a) also report that the covariance of consumption growth with
stock returns based on information from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, is much
lower for non-stockholders than for stockholders.
Before characterizing the equilibrium conditions for this game, it is useful to intro-
duce the following restrictions:
0:5(¯ y+ ¯ d+e)1 g +0:5(¯ y+ ¯ d e)1 g
1 g
>
0:5(¯ y+r l)1 g +0:5(¯ y+r+l)1 g
1 g
(P1)






If (P1) and (P2) are satisﬁed, then the indirect utility of stockholders (non-stock-
holders) dominates that of non-stockholders (stockholders) if m = 0 (1). It is now
possible to introduce the following proposition, which indicates that the participation
game has multiple equilibria.
Proposition 1 (Multiple Equilibria). If conditions (P1) and (P2) are satisﬁed, there
7 It is assumed that income shocks l take only positive values, but even under negative values, it can be
shown that dividend ﬂuctuations can offset income shocks.
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exists a unique ﬁxed point m such that:
V
A0 > V
B0; if 0  m < m
V
A0 = V
B0; if m = m
V
A0 < V
B0; if m < m  1
Proof. See Appendix 2.
It is noted ﬁrst that the indirect utility function of stockholders (non-stockholders)
is monotone decreasing (increasing) in m.8 This implies that the indirect lifetime utility
functions of each type of consumers meet at the ﬁxed point m. When either (P1) or
(P2) is not satisﬁed, there exists a unique full-participation equilibrium. Note that
the restriction of non-negativity imposed on dividends ( ¯ d  e) and deposit interest rate
r =0 necessarily lead to condition (P1) because the upper bound onV
B0 is smaller than
the lower bound on V
A0 even when l ' 0:





In addition, (P2) is more likely to be satisﬁed when l takes large values. The most
risky environment l ' ¯ y and e ' ¯ d ensures that (P1) and (P2) are satisﬁed.
The remainder of the section examines the equilibrium conditions under incom-
plete market participation. The following relation can be obtained when m = m:
0:5(¯ y+ ¯ d+e +lm)1 g +0:5(¯ y+ ¯ d e  lm)1 g
(1 g)(1 b)
=
0:5[¯ y+r l(1 m)]1 g +0:5[¯ y+r+l(1 m)]1 g
(1 g)(1 b)
(14)
The indirect utilities of stockholders and non-stockholders evaluated at the two
consumption states are equivalent. This is illustrated in Figure 1 where a ﬁxed point
m involving the payoffs from market participation decision is considered.
It is useful to introduce at this point of the analysis the concept of certainty equiv-
alent of the stochastic consumption CE(c
i ). In equilibrium under incomplete market
participation, the certainty equivalent of stockholders is equal to that of non-stock-





B) CE can be interpreted as the stockholders’ and non-stockholders’ risk pre-
mia, respectively. The market participation risk premium (MPRP) can thus be deﬁned
as E(c
A) E(c
B). The level of expected returns is function of the exposure to market
participation risks, which are inclusive of uninsured income risks as well as dividend
risks.
It is clear from Figure 2 that if the consumption of stockholders becomes more
volatile, then a higher MPRP is required. In equilibrium, the MPRP can be shown to
8 This ﬁxed point can be regarded as a sunspot equilibrium, which can be achieved when consumers have
self-fulﬁlling expectations m. Reference on sunspot models can be also made to earlier studies by Azariadis
(1981), Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) and Cass and Shell (1983), inter alias.
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Figure 1. Risk aversion and equilibrium incomplete market participation
be equal to d r. Also, if consumers are more risk averse and dividends are ﬁxed, then
the equilibrium conditions can only be sustained through adjustments in the degree of
incomplete market participation (m decreases).
Figure 2. Certainty equivalent and market participation risk premium
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4. Numerical analysis
The equilibria asset prices can be also characterized with simple numerical calculus.
The CRRA preferences, labor income shocks, deposit interest rate and equity can be
described by the set of parameters (b; g; ¯ y; l; ¯ r; E[e R]; e).
It is possible to derive the degree of incomplete market participation (m), equity
premium and risk-free rate. The equilibrium incomplete market participation (m) can
be obtained by ﬁxing (b; ¯ y; l; ¯ r; E[e R]; e) and altering the risk aversion parameter g 2
(0;10]. Finally, in order to examine the equilibrium risk-free rate and equity premium,
the set of (g;m) and ﬁxed values (b; ¯ y; l; ¯ r; E[e R]; e) are substituted into equations (9)
and (11).
4.1 Equilibrium incomplete market participation
For the purposes of benchmark calibration, the time period is set to one year, the dis-
count factor at b =0:9, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion at g =1, and the deposit
interest rate at r =0:75%. The levels of equity risk and labor income shocks need to be
determined however. Suppose that E[e R] = 1:07, e = 0:16, ¯ y = 1, and l = 0:3, which
implies that the likelihood of a 15 percent change in return on equity, and a 30 percent
change in labor income, amounts to 50 percent.9
Figure 3. Multiple equilibria and welfare
9 This level of volatility on equity returns is consistent with the results from Campbell (2000). There are
however, no precise estimates of the level of individual income risks. Hence, the present analysis is based on
various levels of income risk. When the expected labor income is high relative to expected equity returns, the
lifetime indirect utility of market participants dominates that for non-stockholders irrespective of the ratio of
non-market participation m.
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Figure 3 describes the effect of non-market participants on the value function of
each agent, and presents the multiple equilibria fE1;E2;E3g. If m is smaller than 70
percent, thenthevaluefunctionofmarketparticipantsislargerthanthatfornon-market
participants. This implies that under such conditions, consumers decide to participate
also in asset markets. Therefore, the fraction of non-stockholders is equal to zero,
which reﬂects a full participation economy. When m is larger than 0.7 however, there
is no demand for equity and bonds as all consumers decide not to participate in asset
markets. In the case where m = 0:7, the equilibrium E1 is achieved, with a positive
fraction of rational non-market participants.
Table 2. Risk aversion parameters and equilibrium incomplete market participation
b g ¯ y E[e R] e l m










These results are brieﬂy presented in Table 2 where the ﬁrst row refers to the base-
line calibration, whereas the remaining lines allow for the examination of the rela-
tionship between risk aversion and equilibrium incomplete market participation. In
the benchmark case, the fraction of market participants in equilibrium (E1) represents
only 30 percent, which is similar to the evidence from Mankiw and Zeldes (1991).
An increase in risk aversion has the effect of driving down the degree of incomplete
market participation at equilibrium. In light of this analytical evidence on the relation-
ship between risk aversion and incomplete market participation, the following section
attempts to explain the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle.
4.2 Equity premium and risk-free rate
The analysis has shown that there is a potential for multiple equilibria, including equi-
librium under incomplete market participation (E1), under full participation (E2), and
under no market participation (E3). The equity premium and risk-free rate can be
characterized only for the equilibrium conditions under incomplete or full market par-
ticipation.
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Figure 4. Equity premium under incomplete market participation
Figure 5. Equity premium under full participation
Figure 4 displays the calibrated gross equity premia, where the parameters m and g
areassumedtobeequalto0.7and1, respectively. Thissettingallowsforthereplication
of the historical average equity premium of 6%, which is documented in the literature.
Figure5displaystheequitypremiuminthecaseofequilibriumunderfullparticipation.
It is required that the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion amounts to 2.6 in order to
achieve the equity premium value of 6% reported in the literature.
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Figure 6. Risk-free rate under incomplete market participation
Figure 7. Risk-free rate under full participation
The calibrated risk-free rate represents the average of the two values obtained un-
der different states. The risk-free rate, shown in Figure 6, falls from 1.13 to 0.58 as the
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion rises from 0 to 3. In equilibrium, the net risk-free
rate is about 0.75 percent, which is consistent with the estimated values in the empi-
rical literature.10 However, the risk-free rate puzzle does not seem to be completely
10 The value of g is set to 1, which is consistent with the equity premium and risk-free rate documented in
the literature.
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solved since the risk-free rate in Figure 7 is about 3 percent which is relatively high
by historical standards. Thus, the present model can partly explain the equity premium
and risk-free rate puzzles under incomplete market participation.
4.3 The role of social security and self-insurance
The modeling approach by Mankiw (1986) and Weil (1992, 1994) based on ﬁnite-lived
agents in incomplete markets, suggests that the idiosyncratic income ﬂuctuations can
partly explain both the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles. In the multi-period
setting where shocks are not persistent, Levine and Zama (2002) show that market
incompleteness can be partially circumvented using self-insurance, where agents can
signiﬁcantly hedge against the effects of idiosyncratic risk by mutually borrowing and
lending assets among each other. Constantinides and Dufﬁe (1996) show also that in-
complete consumption insurance can explain the risk premium puzzle when individual
endowment shocks are persistent. However, the empirical evidence lends little sup-
port to the proposition of highly persistent idiosyncratic shocks, according to Heaton
and Lucas (1986). Constantinides et al. (2002) investigate the effects of limited mar-
ket participation generated by borrowing constraints on asset prices in an overlapping
generations economy. The existence of borrowing constraints on young agents has
prohibitive effects on self-insurance.11
In contrast to the existing literature, the present study shows that even under the in-
ﬁnite horizon setting, it is possible to explain the equity premium puzzle and risk-free
rate puzzle, under the condition of incomplete market participation. The evidence sug-
gests that risk-sharing externalities may have disruptive effects on self-insurance. In
particular, if the income ﬂuctuations of market participants are correlated, it becomes
more difﬁcult to make recourse to safe assets for insurance purposes. It is explicitly as-
sumed that market participants have access to bond markets whereas non-stockholders
rely on deposits. Hence, the existence of multiple safe assets has prohibitive effects on
self-insurance even if borrowing constraints do not exist. However, if the government
provides alternative solutions by substituting social security tt for the safe assets bt
and b bt, then such income transfers can create risk-sharing opportunities between mar-
ket participants and non-market participants. Indeed, the income transfers from market
participants with positive income shocks to non-market participants with negative in-
come shocks can whittle down the effects of income shocks. Thus, the development of
social security programs can contribute toward the elimination of incomplete market
participation and the explanation of the equity premium puzzle in the Lucas economy.
5. Conclusion
This study examined the effects of risk-sharing externalities on asset prices using the
inﬁnite-horizon model under endogenous labor income risks. In the equilibrium with
incomplete marketparticipation, this modelcan partlyexplain both theequity premium
11 The literature also suggests that uninsured income risks promote precautionary savings. Examples of
uninsured income risk models include Aiyagari (1994), Angeletos and Calvet (2006), Devereaux and Smith
(1994), Huggett (1993), Mankiw (1986), and Weil (1992a, 1994), inter alia.
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puzzle and risk-free rate puzzle. However, it cannot explain the risk-free rate puzzle
under full participation equilibrium. This failure is attenuated by the fact that equilib-
rium under full participation is less likely given the prevailing constraints on market
participation.
On the other hand, equilibrium with incomplete market participation is unstable
because small changes in any parameter values can be conducive to departures from
equilibrium. The equity and bond returns can indeed vary depending on the underlying
conditions of incomplete or full participation. These results open new avenues for
theoretical and empirical research on the relationship between the degree of incomplete
market participation and the signiﬁcance of equity risk premium and risk-free rate
puzzles.
The equilibrium with incomplete market participation is worse than full-participa-
tion equilibria in terms of social welfare. However, Ohno (2009) investigates the equi-
librium growth rate of capital stock and social welfare when risk-sharing externalities
are incorporated into the inﬁnite-horizon production economy. The spillover effects
on production technologies lead to the under-accumulation of capital stocks. Under
equilibrium incomplete market participation, the endowment risks cannot be fully di-
versiﬁed as they induce precautionary savings, which have the potential to increase the
equilibrium growth rates and improve social welfare. This approach has the potential
of shedding light on important economic issues such as the role of ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries, ﬁnancial market integration, international risk-sharing puzzle, inter alia.
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Appendix 1: Risk-sharing externalities
The following example provides an intuitive explanation of risk-sharing externalities
and considers two types of jobs and inﬁnite number of agents. Each consumer decides
to belong to one of two risk-sharing groups denoted by i = A;B. Let us consider two
states (s=1;2) in two period economy. The probabilities of each state are equal to 0.5.
Assume that each consumer receives the following stochastic endowments which are
associated with different jobs j (j = 1;2) and the ratio of each job j to consumers is
assumed to be 0:5:
Job 1 Job 2
State 1 ¯ e+e ¯ e e
State 2 ¯ e e ¯ e+e
The average endowment and endowment shocks are denoted by ¯ e and e, respectively.
Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that endowment shocks are positive and
smaller than average endowments in order to eschew cases of negative consumption.
Under state 1 for instance, while consumers with job 1 receive ¯ e+e units of consump-
tion good while those with job 2 obtain ¯ e e units only. Individual consumers consider















Within each group, complete Arrow-Debreu securities are available.12 Let qi
s be
the price of a unit of consumption in date 1 state s within group i. Then, the budget





















This implies that the marginal rate of substitution for any individual within a particular
group is equal to the Arrow-Debreu asset price. These asset prices differ across groups,
but they are the same for all consumers within a given group irrespective of variations
12 The Arrow-Debreu security is a security that pays one unit of numeraire if a speciﬁed state is realized and
zero otherwise.
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for j 6= j0 (A1)










for j 6= j0: (A2)
Thus for a given group, individual consumption patterns are similar. This implies
that shocks to consumption across individuals within the same group are perfectly
correlated. Given the proportion kj 2 [0;0:5] of group-A consumers with job j; the












Again, it is noted that individuals are classiﬁed into group A or B depending on their





jsjkj), then participation into group A is implied. In the same




jsjkj) is conducive to participation
into group B. These relations can be regarded as individual rationality conditions.
If consumers with different types of jobs j = 1 and j = 2 participate in group A at
equal rates k1 = k2, then it is possible to smooth their individual consumption cA
js = ¯ e.
This is consistent with a fully-integrated Arrow-Debreu economy. However, when
consumers fall into two subgroups with different participation ratios k1 6= k2, then it
is difﬁcult to fully diversify away the endowment risks, which are also conducive to
the exposure to consumption risks. This implies that the income variance sA(m) is
not necessarily monotone increasing in m. However, this assumption is required to
guarantee the existence of equilibria.
Indeed, even though there is no aggregate shocks to the economy, neither group
can offset the individual endowment shocks. The degree of market participation can
be determined under conditions of sunspot equilibria. If consumers have the same
self-fulﬁlling expectations kj, then any ﬁxed point satisﬁng equations (A1), (A2) and
(A3) as well as the individual rationality conditions deﬁned above, becomes an equi-
librium point. Since the case of unequal participation ratios k1 6= k2 is not dominant,
consumers have an incentive to move into another risk-sharing group. However, trans-
fers between groups is restricted by the assumption of one-time participation game,
in which the decision of individual agents to participate into a given group is also
independent of the decisions achieved by others. Thus, given the assumption that indi-
vidual decisions are irreversible, equilibrium exist even under non-dominant participa-
tion conditions k1 6= k2:
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Appendix 2
Lemma 1. V
A0 is monotone decreasing and V
B0 is monotone increasing in m.
Proof. The ﬁrst derivative of the value function for stockholders with respect to the
ratio of incomplete market participation ¶V




(¯ y+lm + ¯ d+e) g  (¯ y lm + ¯ d e) g
:
The difference in marginal utilities between state 1 and 2 (¯ y+lm + ¯ d +e) g  (¯ y 
lm+ ¯ d e) g is negative because x g is decreasing in x when g >0, and ¯ y+lm+ ¯ d+
e > ¯ y lm + ¯ d e(> 0), which implies that ¶V
A0=¶m < 0. In the same way, the ﬁrst
derivative of the value function for non-market participants ¶V





[¯ y+ ¯ r l(1 m)] g  [¯ y+ ¯ r+l(1 m)] g	
:
Then, [¯ y+ ¯ r l(1 m)] g  [¯ y+ ¯ r+l(1 m)] g > 0 implying that ¶V
B0=¶m > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1. It is possible to demonstrate that when (P1) is satisﬁed,
then the lifetime utility of stockholders dominates that of non-stockholders under full
market participation m =0. Under these conditions, the respective utility functions can
be expressed as follows:
V
A0(0) =





0:5(¯ y+ ¯ r l)1 g +0:5(¯ y+ ¯ r+l)1 g
(1 g)(1 b)
Similarly, the indirect utility of non-stockholders dominates that of stockholders









(¯ y+ ¯ r)1 g
(1 g)(1 b)
:





A0(1) must be satisﬁed becauseV
A0 is monotone decreasing and
V
B0 is monotone increasing in m, as shown by the lemma above. 
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